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Abstract— It is well known that security threats, in wireless ad
hoc networks, are becoming a serious problem which may lead
to harmful consequences on network performance. Despite that,
many routing protocols still not resilient to such threats or their
countermeasures are not efficient. Moreover, the vulnerability of
MAC layer protocols to some attacks exacerbates the damage
caused by the threats at higher layers. Therefore, cooperation
between layers is compulsory to face such devastating threats.
In this paper, we address a cross-layer attack targeting proactive
routing protocols, which is launched at the routing level and
reinforced at the MAC layer in order to amplify the resulted
damage. We demonstrate that this attack can severely compro-
mise the routing protocols and lead to large data packets loss. We
particularly analyze it under the Optimized Link State Routing
(OLSR) protocol in detail and propose a lightweight solution to
cope with it. The simulation results confirm the efficiency of this
solution.
Keywords – Cross-layer Attack, Virtual-link Attack, False Vali-
dation Attack, Ad Hoc Networks, OLSR.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase in computation power, the compactness of
size, incorporation of mobility and ease of connectivity from
anywhere are amongst the major factors that resulted in
tremendous growth of handheld devices in recent years. From
cordless phones to cellular networks and from WiFi to sensors,
the wireless medium has become the preferred backbone of to-
day’s deployed networks. The newest model being introduced
is the Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET), in which mobile
nodes, within the transmission range of each others, can com-
municate directly over the wireless link, while those that are
far apart use other nodes as relays. The properties of MANET,
such as shared wireless medium, open network architecture,
stringent resource constraints and rapidly changing topology
make this type of network vulnerable to a bunch of attacks at
different layers, especially at MAC layer in which attacks are
launched easily. Therefore, the task of securing such network
remains hard and necessitates careful investigation.
To address the routing problems with the intrinsic features
of MANET, numerous protocols have been devised and further
standardized by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force),
among which the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)
protocol [3]. The major drawback of OLSR, as all other ad hoc
protocols, is that it has not been designed and thought with
respect to security issues. Hence it is exposed to many types of
misuse leading to a dramatic drop of the network performance
and services. Additionally, any node can misbehave and try to
disrupt the routing process by injecting tampered or even fake
information in the network. Notice that the lack of security
considerations in the design of these routing protocols have
penalized, especially, the neighbor discovery process since
it becomes easy to spoof any identity/link of/with nodes
and disseminate false topology information within the whole
network.
In this work, we address one of the attacks targeting
neighbor discovery phase in OLSR. This attack is launched at
routing level by implementing a virtual link attack (VLINK)
leading to establishment of false symmetric link between the
target nodes connected via an asymmetric link. So, an incorrect
MPR (Multi-Point Relay) set may be elected by the target
nodes as well as their neighbors leading to selection of broken
routes to forward data packets. Subsequently, a false validation
attack is initiated at MAC level by another colluding node
in order to reinforce the VLINK attack and make it more
destructive. To counter this attack, we propose a cross-layer
solution in which the routing layer needs to get a confirmation
from MAC layer regarding the status of a specific link before
advertising it to the network. In order to check the symmetry
of a link, the RTS (Request to Send) and CTS (Clear to Send)
frames format is modified to prevent the malicious node acting
at MAC layer from falsely validating the well reception of the
RTS and DATA frames being transmitted by one of the target
nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section gives a brief description of some works dealing with
security threats in OLSR. Next, we address the joint virtual
link and false validation attack on OLSR in section III. In
section IV, we present our proposed solution and analyze
its robustness against the possible security threats. In section
V, we report our simulation and discuss the obtained results.
Finally, section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, many schemes have been proposed to secure
the routing protocols against different attacks launched by
malicious or compromised nodes. In the sequel, we briefly
describe some of these solutions and emphasize their strengths
and limitations.
In [2], packet leashes have been used to protect routing
protocols against wormhole attacks. In this scheme, a leash is
defined as any information attached to a packet in order to limit
its maximum transmission distance. Two types of leashes have
been proposed: geographical leashes and temporal leashes.
In the geographical leash, the sender appends its location
and sending time to the packet. Based on this information,
the receiving node computes an upper bound on the distance
separating it from the sender. One of the disadvantages of this
solution is that it requires a coarse synchronization of all nodes
in the network which is not always feasible in MANET. In the
temporal leash, the sender attaches the sending time into the
packet, which allows the receiver to computes the traveling
distance of that packet. This distance is calculated based on
the assumption that propagation of wireless signal is equal
to the speed of light. This latter also suffers from the same
disadvantage of the former one as clocks synchronization is
pre-requirements for its efficiency.
SOLSR (Secure OLSR) [6] aims to prevent any threats
targeting the integrity of the exchanged control traffic in the
network. To this end, it proposes to piggyback a packet’s
signature to the transmitted packet, while using hash chains
to secure the Time To Live and Hop Count mutable fields.
Furthermore, SOLSR provides also a countermeasure to cope
with the Wormhole attack which targets the neighbor discovery
phase. This solution can be summarized as follows: the node
sends probe packets to measure their travel time, from which
it can infer the travel distance and then compares it with its
transmission range, if the traveled distance is greater than the
transmission range then this message may have been tunneled
through the wormhole. This solution is efficient however it is
still exposed to some threats such as the Byzantine behavior
of legitimate nodes and misuses at MAC layer which may
significantly affect its robustness.
A new attack targeting OLSR was introduced in [7], in
which two malicious nodes N1 and N2 collude each other
to disturb the protocol’s functioning. In this attack, the first
attacker N1 inserts in its Hello message all nodes 2-hops
neighbors (link spoofing attack) of the victim node to force its
election as the only MPR of this node. Afterwards, the second
attacker N2, which is chosen by N1 as its only MPR node,
drops all routing packets passing through it. Consequently, the
victim node is isolated from the network. To defend against
this attack, the authors propose to extend the list of 1-hop
neighbors nodes advertised in Hello message to include also
the list of 2-hops neighbors of the sender. Based on this
information, a node can detect whether one of its neighbors
advertises a forged links in its hello message or not. The
detection is carried out as follows; if node N1 is 1-hop
neighbor of node X then N1 should be advertised as 2-hops
neighbor in all X’s 1-hop neighbor Hello message. This rule
cannot be satisfied if N1 misbehaves and consequently it can
be detected easily. This scheme may fail to take a correct
decision when the nodes’ mobility increases. This due to the
fact that false alarms may be triggered frequently when links
between nodes break.
The solution proposed in [11] is based on three hops
acknowledgment to cope with the cooperative black hole
attack in OLSR. It adds two extra packets to OLSR, Hello-
rep packet which is a slight modification to Hello message
and a small acknowledgment packet. Each MPR node M
acquires the list of its 3-hops neighbors reached through a
distinct pair of consecutive MPR nodes (M1, M2), where M2
is the MPR node of M1. Afterwards, the node M selects
one node from this set to which it requests an authenticated
acknowledgment. This acknowledgment aims to confirm the
reception of the TC message generated/forwarded by M.
Notice that the authentication process is carried out using a
pre-established secret key between node M and the requested
node during network initialization. If the number of missed
acknowledgements overtakes a predefined threshold the MPR
nodes on the suspicious path are considered as malicious and
consequently will never be selected as MPR. Moreover, no
further packet will be forwarded for these detected nodes.
Another attack against OLSR, called Node Isolation attack,
is described in [8]. In this attack, an MPR node denies to
generate its TC (Topology Control) message to prevent its
MPR selector’s nodes from communicating with other nodes
in the network. Notice that the attacker node is selected as the
only MPR node by the victims by using the same technique
described in [7]. To defend against this attack, the authors
propose a solution that consists of two phases: detection phase
and avoidance phase. In the detection phase each node uses the
promiscuous mode to verify whether its MPR node generates
correctly its TC message or not. In the second phase, a slight
modification to Hello message format is carried by adding a
new field named Request-value. Further on, any MPR node
receiving a Hello message in which the field Request-value
is set to 1 it has to advertise the sender identity as an MPR
selector in its TC message. Therefore, even if the attacker
doesn’t generate the TC message the victim nodes ensure the
communication with the rest of the network.
III. JOINT VIRTUAL LINK ATTACK AND FALSE VALIDATION
ATTACK
Many devices with different computation and communi-
cation capabilities establish temporary links to form an ad
hoc network. As opposed to homogenous environment, where
symmetric links are the more general observed fact, routing in
a heterogeneous MANET is dominated by many asymmetric
links. There are several reasons for the appearance of such
links, some of which are stated as follows:
• Due to the varying transmission ranges the devices
with stronger communication capabilities may reach the
weaker ones but the opposite is not possible.
• In order to achieve power-aware communication, the
wireless devices adjust their transmitting power according
to their residual power such that their lifetimes are
extended. In such communication circumstances, some
of the symmetric links may become asymmetric when
(a) Step 1: attack carried at routing level by
node M1
(b) Step 2: attack carried at MAC level by
node M2
(c) Step 3: attack carried at MAC level by
node M2
Figure 1: The attack description
the communication capability of a node degrades due to
decrease in the residual power.
• The transmission range of some devices having the same
communication capabilities may vary due to fading [10]
and random transient phenomenon.
Malicious nodes may get benefits from asymmetric links
to launch attacks as depicted in Figure III. In this figure,
we consider nodes A, B and M1 running OLSR and having
different transmission capabilities. Node A is beyond the
transmission range of node B, and similarly B is unable
to receive messages sent by node M1. During the neighbor
discovery phase, the malicious node M1 relays B’s Hello
message towards A in order to establish a fake symmetric link
(virtual link (VLINK) as dubbed in [9]). At the end of this
phase, both nodes A and B believe that they share a symmetric
link between them. Therefore a serious degradation of OLSR
performance can be resulted as shown later in section V.
To summarize, we present the following sequence of Hello
messages being exchanged to set up the fake symmetric link.
• Scenario 1
1) A −→ ∗ : Hello, {∅}.
2) B −→ ∗ : Hello, {A,ASYM}.
3) M1 −→ A : Hello, {A,ASYM}.
4) A −→ ∗ : Hello, {B,SYM}.
5) B −→ ∗ : Hello, {A,SYM}.
• Scenario2
1) B −→ ∗ : Hello, {∅}.
2) M1 −→ A : Hello, {∅}.
3) A −→ ∗ : Hello, {B,ASYM}.
4) B −→ ∗ : Hello, {A,SYM}.
5) M1 −→ A : Hello, {A,SYM}.
6) A −→ ∗ : Hello, {B,SYM}.
where ∗ denotes the dissemination of a message and {Id,
link} refers to the content of Hello message where id is the
neighbor identity and link is the status of the link connecting
the sender of the message and the node id.
Notice that we distinguish two scenarios which lead to
establish the fake symmetric link as illustrated above. In the
first scenario the malicious node M1 has to relay the B’s Hello
message only once to launch the attack, however in the second
scenario it has to relay this message twice. Therefore it spends
more energy in this latter than the former case.
Since the default value of the interval separating two con-
secutive transmissions of Hello message is set to 2 seconds,
then whenever the victim node B, transmitting packets towards
the node A, detects a link break at MAC layer it launches a
new shortest path search from the routing table. Notice that a
link is lost if the number of missed CTS or ACK frames has
overtaken a specified threshold. So after finding a new path the
node B transmits its data packets successfully to the intended
destination until the next Hello message from A is received
again, and the same scenario will be repeated.
In order to prevent such situation, the malicious node
M2 replies to all RTS and DATA packets sent by node B
by sending back the corresponding validation frames CTS
and ACK respectively as depicted in Figures 1(b) and 1(c).
This misbehavior is called false validation attack. Therefore,
the victim node B keeps constantly transmitting its packets
through the compromised link and consequently none of them
reaches its destination
For both traffic flows TCP and UDP this attack leads to
data packets loss since no link break advertisement is sent to
the higher layer to replace the broken link. For TCP flows the
sender node reduces its sliding window size gradually each
time the expected end-to-end acknowledgment is missed until
it reaches zero and the flow is interrupted accordingly, however
in UDP traffic the sender continues transmitting its packets un-
til its completion and hence it consumes more energy uselessly.
For the security point of view, this attack leads the sender
node to falsely accuse the intended receiver as misbehaving
or decreases its reputation and trust level if any monitoring
system is set at routing layer such as watchdog or other
schemes that require an explicit authenticated acknowledgment
to verify that its next hop forwards the packets correctly.
Therefore, false alarms may be triggered in the network and
consequently longer paths and network partition may result.
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section we give an overview of the detailed func-
tioning of our solution and its assumptions along with the
analysis of the possible scenarios which may be conducted by
the colluding nodes M1 and M2 in order to break the solution.
In order to cope with the attack described in the previous
section, we have developed a cross-layer solution based on
cooperation between routing and MAC layers. In this solution,
we assume that each pair of nodes shares a secret which
is undisclosed to any other node and that each node holds
a collision free hash function such as SHA-1 (Secure Hash
Algorithm 1) and MD5 (Message Digest 5). Notice that the
preliminary distribution of keys or secrets between the nodes
in MANET can be carried out using some well known schemes
proposed in the literature such as [4] and [5].
Whenever a node receives a Hello message advertising its
identity as an ASYM neighbor then it schedules a transmission
of RTS+ frame towards the sender of this message. The frame
RTS+, as depicted in Figure 2, is a special RTS frame in which
we add a new field of 16 bits dubbed RTS sequence number
(RSN) and replace the @R (destination address) field with the
hash value of the shared secret (SS) between the sender and the
intended receiver combined with the RSN value. The purpose
of adding the field RSN is to prevent reply attacks. Moreover,
we use the value hash (RSN \\ shared secret) as a destination
address to prevent any malicious node from replying an old
RTS+ frame in order to deplete the node A’s energy. Note that
the symbol \\ represents the concatenation operation of RSN
and the SS.
The value of RSN is increased by 1 at each transmission or
retransmission of RTS+ frame as well as upon reception of a
CTS+ frame. Note that the duration field in RTS+ is calculated
as follows:
Duration = TCTS+ + SIFS (1)
because no DATA frame transmission will follow the re-
ception of CTS+ frame. Note that TCTS+ refers to the
transmission time of the CTS+ frame.
Each node receiving the RTS+ frame computes the hash
value of the RSN value combined with its shared secret with
the source node, if it is equal to the value received in RTS+
then the node sends back the corresponding CTS+ frame with
duration field set to 01 and the @R field sets to the hash value
of the shared secret combined with the value (RSN+1). The
format of CTS+ is shown in Figure 3 where its size is 10 bytes
larger than the standard CTS frame.
If the sender of RTS+ didn’t receive the corresponding
CTS+ within the timeout period for several times then this
is a confirmation that the intended receiver is under attack
launched by a third node and consequently no symmetric link
with this victim node will be advertised in the next Hello
message.
Remark: Since the nodes in MANET are equipped with
limited battery power and modest computation capabilities,
we have opted for hash function rather than public/symmetric
key cryptography as it is characterized by its low cost and
fast operations. Notice that the operation speed is a strict
requirement since the delay separating the reception time of
the last bit of RTS+ and the transmission of the first bit of
CTS+ should not overtake the SIFS duration.
1The duration field is set to 0 because no further DATA packet will be
exchanged.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Let us now analyze the possible scenarios by which the
malicious nodes M1 and M2 try to compromise the proposed
solution.
Despite the fact that the destination address of RTS+ frame
is hidden the node M1 may relay all the heard RTS+ frames
or a randomly chosen subset of them towards the victim
node. In this case, the victim node will certainly receive one
RTS+ in which it is the intended receiver, however due to the
incurred delay (d), as a consequence of the retransmission of
the RTS+ by the node M1, the CTS+ will be received after
the expiration of the timeout value TOCTS+. Hence, the link
with the destination node is deleted. Moreover, even though
the node M1 is equipped with a set of directional antennas it is
unable to receive a frame using one antenna and transmits by
another antenna simultaneously. Therefore, the incurred delay
for forwarding the RTS+ frame remains important. The values
of TOCTS+ and delay are calculated as shown in the equations
below.
TOCTS+ = TRTS+ + SIFS + TCTS+ (2)
d = TOCTS+ + TCTS+ (3)
where TOCTS+ is the expected duration for receiving
the CTS+ at the sender node, TRTS+ and TCTS+ are the
transmission time of RTS+ and CTS+, respectively, whereas
the signal propagation delay is ignored.
For more sophisticated scenario, we suppose that the mali-
cious node M1 records the CTS+ at time t and sends it to node
M2 via an encrypted packet. Then, the node M2 replays it later
at time t+ ∆t (because due to nodes mobility the links status
change frequently and the nodes have to check the symmetry
of every new established link) in order to falsely validate the
subsequent RTS+ towards the same destination. The CTS+
frame replied by node M2 will not be considered as a valid
CTS+ since the expected hash value would be calculated using
a RSN larger than the one used for the old CTS+ kept by M2.
Moreover, the node M2 is unable to compute the expected
hash value as the shared secret is unknown.
The operation of the proposed solution is summarized in
the flowchart given in Figure 4. This flowchart describes
the treatment carried out by any node in the network upon
reception of a Hello message. As we can see from this
flowchart, after sending the RTS+ the node waits for CTS+
reception. If it is received after timeout expiration or not
received at all and timeout is expired then it is ignored and the
missed CTS+ counter is increased. Otherwise, if it is received
before timeout expiration then its validity and authentication
should be checked as well in order to prevent any forged or
old CTS+ replied by a malicious node.
Figure 4: Flowchart describing the functioning of our solution
Figure 2: The format of RTS+ frame (32 bytes)
V. SIMULATION
This section reports the simulation results obtained by
implementing the attack described in the section III in OPNET
14.0 network simulator [12]. The simulation settings are
summarized in table I. We consider a MANET consisting of
14 wireless nodes having different transmission ranges. These
nodes are distributed within the area as shown on the topology
depicted in Figure 5.
In order to highlight the impact of this attack a CBR traffic
flow f (500 bytes/packet and 50 packets/s) is initiated from the
Figure 3: The format of CTS+ frame (24 bytes)
node N2 towards the node N10. Notice that the transmission
of data packets is started 20 seconds after the beginning of
the simulation in order to allow each node to construct routes
towards the rest of the network.
On the other hand, the nodes M1 and M2 colludes to launch
a cross layer attack against the nodes A and B, by applying
the same steps described in section III. As a result of this
attack, the MPR sets of nodes B and A are changed due to
Simulation parameters Parameter value
Area 1500m *1000m
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11b
Transmission range 250 m
M1: 150m
M2: 200m
A : 300m
B : 250m
Traffic type CBR
Data rate 11mbps
CBR packets size 512 bytes
Buffer size 62 packets
Short Retry Limit (SRL) 7
Long Retry Limit (LRL) 4
Mobility model Random way point
Hash function MD5 (128 bits)
Simulation time 600s
# simulation epochs 5
Table I: Simulation settings
the new established fake symmetric link as illustrated in Table
II and consequently the routes towards far away nodes are
also changed accordingly. Therefore the new shortest paths
shown in Table IV replace the earlier paths depicted in Table
III. Hence, the link (B, A) is becoming a black hole which
absorbs all the packets routed through it.
The Figures 6 and 7 graph the data packet delivery ratio
of the flow f in the case where only VLINK attack is
carried out and the case where both attacks are launched
together, respectively. As we can see from these figures, when
only VLINK attack is launched the delivery ratio decreases
dramatically however a number of transmitted data packets
still able to reach their destinations. This is due to the fact that
when link break is detected at MAC layer as a consequence
of missed CTS packets for SRL (short retry limit) times, node
B proceeds for selection of a new path towards the node N10.
This new path is maintained until it is replaced again by the
compromised route upon reception of the subsequent Hello
message forwarded by the malicious node. In the other hand,
when both of the attacks are launched (cross layer attack)
the delivery ratio drops sharply because, in this case, no link
break is detected as each data packet transmitted by node B
is validated by node M2 (M2 sends back the corresponding
CTS and ACK frames) which forces the node B to keep
transmitting/forwarding data packets over this path.
Moreover, as depicted in Figure 8, when both of the attacks
are launched together the node B will consume more energy
in forwarding the data packets passing through it as compared
to the case where VLINK attack is launched solely. As a
consequence the energy of node B will deplete quickly which
decreases its life time. As a simple comparison, the node
B transmits 520 bytes (500 bytes corresponds to one data
packet’s size and 20 bytes corresponds to the RTS frame’s
size) rather than 140 bytes (7 transmissions of RTS frame
which is equal to SRL) in case where VLINK attack launched
solely.
Figure 5: Network topology illustrating an example of the
studied cross layer attack
Node MPR set before attack MPR set after attack
A N8 N8, B
B N3 N3, A
Table II: The MPR sets of nodes A and B
Dest addr Next hop Number of hops
A N3 7
N8 N3 6
N10 N3 7
Table III: Routing table of node N2 before the attack
Dest addr Next hop Number of hops
A N3 3
N8 N3 4
N10 N3 5
Table IV: Routing table of node N2 after the attack
Solution efficiency and overhead evaluation
In the sequel we set up a network consisting of 30 nodes
with different transmission ranges, among these nodes 4 are
attackers which collude each other to launch cross layer attacks
against the other nodes. The nodes are randomly placed within
the area and 8 CBR traffic flows are generated in the network
(500bytes/packet, 50 packets/s).
Figure 9 shows that our solution performs well when the
speed of nodes is low (0 m/s and 5 m/s) because the lower
mobility of nodes allows a faster verification of links symmetry
using the proposed technique, hence almost the same packets
delivery ratio is maintained as compared to the case of
network without attackers. When the nodes move faster the
link verification phase may take a longer delay and therefore
some data packets may be dropped due to the lack of an
established path to the destination or data buffer overflow at
MAC layer. Despite that, our solution keeps ensuring around
84% of the packets delivery ratio reached in the case where
no attack is launched.
To assess the overhead generated by our scheme in terms
of the number of the extra bytes sent by each node we vary
the mobility speed of nodes as well as their pause time. Note
Figure 6: Data packets delivery ratio under VLINK attack
solely
Figure 7: Data packets delivery ratio under the cross layer
attack
that in the case of static network (nodes speed = 0m/s) the
value of pause times is insignificant. According to the results
shown in Figures 10(a) and 10(b) we can see that the extra
bytes transmitted by the nodes to prevent the cross layer attack
are very small compared to the transmitted bytes representing
Hello messages, for a static network. This difference decreases
gradually with the increase of nodes speed until the overhead
induced by RTS+ and CTS+ surpasses the one induced by
Hello messages when the nodes speed reaches 20m/s and their
pause times is 0 and 10 seconds. This increase is justified
by the rapidly change of the one hop neighbors set due
to the high mobility of nodes, therefore links are appeared
and disappeared quickly which increase the number of the
transmitted RTS+ and their corresponding CTS+ frames in
Figure 8: Data packets forwarded by node B
Figure 9: The proposed solution efficiency in terms of data
packets delivery ratio under various nodes speed
order to verify the symmetry of these new links. Consequently,
we see that generally the extra overhead induced by our
solution increases when the speed of nodes turns to larger
and their pause times gets smaller.
As a conclusion, the cross layer attack being studied is
more harmful for static networks and is less damaging in
highly mobile networks. In the other hand, our solution works
perfectly with static networks and maintains good results when
the nodes start moving.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the joint virtual link and false validation attack
is analyzed in detail in wireless ad hoc networks running
OLSR. This attack can target any routing protocol in MANET
however its damage differs from one protocol to another. This
attack is launched by two colluding malicious nodes where the
first attacker acts at routing level and the second one at MAC
layer. A cross-layer solution is proposed in order to avoid the
(a) Case of node pause time equal to 0 and 10 seconds
(b) Case of node pause time equal to 30 and 50 seconds
Figure 10: Variation of the overhead added by RTS+ and CTS+
frames versus nodes speed and pause time
harm caused by this attack. In this solution, a node has to
check the symmetry of each new link by sending a special
MAC frame dubbed RTS+ and waiting for the corresponding
CTS+ frame. The reception of the frame CTS+ within the
timeout period and with a valid authentication value confirms
the symmetry of the checked link. The simulation results
confirm that our solution can efficiently prevent the above
attack.
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